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MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
OF FEDERALISM
ROBERT A. MIKOSt
Medical marijuana has emerged as one of the key federalism battle-
grounds of the last two decades. Since 1996, sixteen states have passed
new laws legalizing the drug for certain medical purposes.' All the while,
the federal government has remained committed to zero-tolerance, pro-
hibiting the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana for any
purpose.2 The federal government's uncompromising stance against
medical marijuana seemingly exposes the states' vulnerability to the
whims of the national political process, and it has inspired calls for the
courts to step in and protect state experimentation from this and other
instances of arguable congressional over-reaching. 3
I suggest, however, that the true story of the battle over medical ma-
rijuana and its implications for the political safeguards of federalism is
more nuanced and less gloomy than the standard account portrays. True,
the political safeguards of federalism failed to prevent passage of the
federal ban. Indeed, it seems very little consideration was given to states'
rights when the ban was passed as part of the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) in 1970. And, ironically, the very forces that originally failed to
prevent passage of the ban now preserve it against increasingly loud calls
t Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Government, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity Law School. I thank Alex Kreit, Scott Moss, and participants at the Denver University Law
Review Symposium on Marijuana at the Crossroads for helpful comments on drafts of this symposi-
um contribution. I also thank Brennan Hughes, Stephen Jordan, and Tom Watson for excellent
research assistance.
1. These states include California (1996); Oregon (1998); Washington (1998); Alaska
(1999); Maine (1999); Colorado (2000); Hawaii (2000); Montana (2004); Nevada (2004); Vermont
(2004); Rhode Island (2006); New Mexico (2007); Michigan (2008); New Jersey (2010); Arizona
(2010); and Delaware (2011). See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL
MARIJUANA LAWS, 6-8 (2011), available at http://www.mpp.org/legislation/state-by-state-medical-
marijuana-laws.html.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010).
3. I say "arguable" because I do not believe the federal marijuana ban actually constitutes
congressional over-reaching, even though many others have espoused that view. See, e.g., Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal marijuana ban
exceeds Congress's Commerce power as applied to the purely local production and consumption of
the drug); Brief of the States of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2-3, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336486
("While the amici States may not see eye to eye with some of their neighbors concerning the wisdom
of decriminalizing marijuana possession and use in certain instances, they support their neighbors'
prerogative in our federalist system to serve as 'laboratories of experimentation."' (footnote omitted)
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., Concurring))); Randy E.
Barnett, The Presumption of Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical Marijuana and Fundamental
Rights, 22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 29, 36-39 (2006) (recounting his advocacy on behalf of patients
who challenged federal ban in Gonzales v. Raich).
997
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
for reform. But since the emergence of the medical marijuana movement
in California in the mid-1990s, the political process has worked to un-
dermine the federal ban's impact on medical use of the drug. The reality
on the ground today is that the federal ban on marijuana is largely tooth-
less. To be sure, it has bite in individual cases and it clearly shapes the
way states regulate medical marijuana. But it hasn't stopped the medical
marijuana movement. More than 400,000 people already use the drug
pursuant to state medical marijuana programs.4 Medical marijuana dis-
pensaries have proliferated-at one point, they supposedly outnumbered
Starbucks and McDonalds in Los Angeles County.5 And nearly every
year new states jump on the bandwagon and pass medical marijuana
laws.
The budding success of the medical marijuana movement offers a
number of broader lessons about the power of the states in our federal
system. In this symposium contribution, I use the case of medical mari-
juana to demonstrate that the national political process can protect states'
prerogatives, even when Congress passes and the federal courts uphold
legislation that arguably over-reaches. I suggest that political forces can
help curtail the enforcement of federal laws post-enactment. Though
these laws remain on the books, under-enforcement helps to preserve
state prerogatives they supposedly supplant. I also briefly consider some
shortcomings of these de facto constraints on the federal government's
law-enforcement power, especially in comparison to formal dejure con-
straints on its lawmaking power.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the political
safeguards literature and its focus on federal lawmaking. It also explains
why medical marijuana poses a challenge to the political safeguards ar-
gument. Part II then discusses the political safeguards that exist at the
law enforcement stage. It explains how the federal government's limited
law enforcement capacity can help to undo at least some of the damage
caused by (arguably) over-reaching federal legislation. Part III then iden-
tifies the shortcomings of relying exclusively on enforcement constraints
to protect federalism. Nevertheless, it suggests that enforcement con-
straints can help to promote the values of federalism, even if imperfectly.
4. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States'
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1464 (2009) (estimating
participation at 400,000 as of 2009).
5. See Roger Parloff, How Pot Became Legal, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 2009, at 156, available at
http://www.santabarbaraca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/82A61 E58-3E97-4D45-864C-
7CD80ElD72Fl/0/FortuneMagazineArticle92809.pdf (reporting that medical marijuana dispensa-
ries outnumber Starbucks and McDonald's locations combined in L.A. County).
6. See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LEGISLATION 2012
(2012), available at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/MMJBills2012.pdf (cataloguing pending
state medical marijuana legislation).
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I. POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS AT THE LAW-MAKING STAGE
The standard account of the political safeguards of federalism fo-
cuses on how the national lawmaking process helps to block the passage
of legislation that threatens the states' constitutional prerogatives. There
are several features of the national political process that are supposed to
keep Congress at bay. To illustrate the idea, I need only discuss a few.
First, the states have a strong voice and sympathetic ear in Wash-
ington. Nearly two-thirds of state governors maintain permanent offices
in Washington, DC, through which they can lobby Congress on behalf of
their states.8 State lawmakers and executive officials also engage in co-
ordinated lobbying campaigns, managed by organizations like the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures.9 What is more, it has been sug-
gested that federal officials are prone to heed the demands of the states'
lobbies because many of these officials began their careers in state gov-
ernment. As Larry Kramer explains, "A very high percentage of employ-
ees in all three branches of the federal government began their careers
working for states.... With views shaped by this background and expe-
rience, these former state officials remain aware of and sympathetic to
the concerns of state institutions-a feeling undoubtedly reinforced by
continuing ties to friends and former colleagues still in the state sys-
tem."' 0
Second, ordinary citizens may be reluctant to expand the federal
government's authority vis-a-vis the states. As I have explained else-
where,
First, some citizens may fear that congressional action on one issue
may lay the groundwork for federalizing related issues-issues on
which they would prefer state control. Second, citizens may worry
about how laws will be enforced by Executive branch officials in the
federal government. .. . Since they trust state governments more than
they trust the federal government, and since they generally exert
more control over state executive officials (via direct election and re-
7. The canonical work in the literature is, of course, Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). For a sampling of the literature inspired at least in part by
Wechsler's thesis, see, for example, JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF
DESIGN (2008); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards ofFederalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L.
REV. 265 (1990); Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 01H. ST. L.J. 1669
(2007); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace,
56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003).
8. JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 35 (2009).
9. Kramer, supra note 7, at 285 n.272.
10. Id. at 285.
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calls), citizens may prefer to have state officials administer the laws
(and have state courts interpret them), and hence, may oppose con-
gressional legislation that vests enforcement authority in federal offi-
cials. Third, citizens also care about government processes, and not
just the outcomes of those processes. Some citizens value the oppor-
tunity to participate directly in lawmaking that is only available at the
state level (via ballot initiatives, etc.) and thus may resist efforts to
federalize policy domains that crowd out such opportunities. Moreo-
ver, some citizens value federalism itself; that is, they have opinions
about which level of government ought to control various policy do-
mains, and these federalism beliefs may temper their support for
congressional proposals which, though appealing on the merits, in-
trude into domains they believe in principle should be controlled by
the states instead. 1 I
To the extent that members of Congress heed the preferences of their
constituents, they might opt not to pursue legislation given what I have
called the "[p]opulist [d]istaste for [flederalization."l 2
Third, the national law-making process is designed to impede con-
gressional action. Bicameralism, presentment, and the Senate filibuster
create several chokepoints at which federal legislation can be blocked.13
By making it very difficult to enact federal laws, the Constitution
"leave[s] the states free to govern" on many important issues.14
These features of our polity make the passage of federal legislation
very difficult, but not impossible. What happens when these safeguards
fail to block the passage of over-reaching legislation? This clearly hap-
pens. The corpus of federal criminal law alone is replete with examples.
Any number of the 3,000 plus federal criminal provisions might seem to
encroach upon state prerogatives. 5 (The exact number of violations de-
pends on one's views regarding the proper national role in our federal
system.)16
11. Mikos, supra note 7, at 1673-74; see also Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens
Care About Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007) (using
survey experiment to demonstrate that citizens' federalism beliefs and their judgments about the
comparative trustworthiness of federal and state authorities could temper their support for congres-
sional legislation).
12. Mikos, supra note 7 at 1691.
13. Clark, supra note 7, at 1339 (arguing that "[miultiple veto gates establish, in effect, a
supermajority requirement[]" for the passage of federal laws); see also Mikos, supra note 7, at 1691
(concluding that the states' majoritarian-friendly lawmaking procedures gives them a decided ad-
vantage vis-i-vis Congress in satisfying citizens' policy preferences).
14. Clark, supra note 7, at 1329.
15. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998).
16. There are at least some federal criminal statutes that are uncontroversial, either because
they serve a distinct federal interest-e.g., protecting the President-or because they target a "prob-
lem" the states readily acknowledge but are not capable of addressing-e.g., smuggling of narcotics
across international borders.
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The ban on medical marijuana is one prominent example. The ban
obviously made its way through the "gauntlet"' 7 that is the federal law-
making process. The scheduling of marijuana was but one issue among
many in the comprehensive federal drug reforms that were passed by
Congress in 1970. Indeed, Congress chose to place marijuana on Sched-
ule I-a categorization reserved for the most dangerous and least re-
deeming of substances-in spite of the misgivings of some prominent
Nixon Administrative officials. In testimony before Congress in 1969,
for example, Assistant Secretary of Health and Scientific Affairs Dr.
Roger Egeberg recommended that Congress "make a clear legal distinc-
tion between marihuana and the hard narcotics, with which it has errone-
ously been associated in law and the public mind." 18 Despite Egeberg's
protestations, however, Congress proceeded to list marijuana on Sched-
ule I, and despite repeated petitions to revisit that decision, 19 marijuana
has remained on that list for more than forty years.
For those who believe that Congress has no business regulating ma-
rijuana, the political safeguards failed in a very important sense. The
political safeguards failed to stop Congress from running roughshod over
state prerogatives concerning this important issue. The federal ban that
was enacted makes no exceptions, for medical use or otherwise. 20 Even
research employing the drug is permitted only sparingly.21 Anyone who
possesses, distributes, or cultivates marijuana pursuant to state law can
be criminally prosecuted-among other things-for violating the federal
ban.22 State medical marijuana laws provide no defense against federal
enforcement actions.23
What is more, as if to throw salt on the wound, the same forces that
originally failed to block adoption of the federal marijuana ban now
17. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TExAS L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2000).
18. Crime in America-Views on Marihuana: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on
Crime, 91st Cong. 7 (Oct. 14, 1969) (statement of Dr. Roger 0. Egeberg delivered by Dr. Jesse
Steinfeld).
19. E.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON MARlIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING (1972) (recommending de-criminalization of simple possession of marijuana);
see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 n.23 (2005) (recounting history of failed petitions before
the DEA to re-schedule marijuana); Letter from Lincoln Chafee, Governor of R.I., & Christine
Gregoire, Governor of Wash., to Michele Leonhart, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/priorities/
healthcare/petition/combined document.pdf (detailing governors' recent petition to reschedule
marijuana).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (holding that the terms of the statute "leave no doubt that [a medical necessity]
defense is unavailable" in criminal prosecutions under the CSA).
21. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 1433-34 (discussing federal government's apparent reluctance
to approve research on medical uses for marijuana).
22. For a discussion of the civil sanctions that can be imposed against medical marijuana, see
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New Approach to Medical
Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 633, 634 (2011).
23. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
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work to entrench it. Public opinion polls consistently show that more
than 70% of American adults favor legalization of medical marijuana. 24
Yet, given the obstacles to federal lawmaking outlined above, it still
seems unthinkable that Congress would act to reschedule marijuana any-
time soon--even 70% support may not be enough.
II. THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS AT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT STAGE
So, does episodic overreaching by Congress demonstrate that the
political safeguards of federalism are a failure? Does it bolster the case
for more aggressive judicial review of federalism issues? In the context
of medical marijuana, does it make the claim that Gonzales v. Raich2 5 -a
seminal Supreme Court case upholding the federal marijuana ban-was
wrongly decided, and that the Court should have barred Congress from
regulating some activities regarding marijuana?
Not necessarily. Putting aside debates over the legitimacy of relying
exclusively on the political safeguards approach, 2 6 I suggest that the po-
litical safeguards haven't necessarily failed to protect state prerogatives.
Even when the federal government passes over-reaching legislation, the
political process may nonetheless preserve state prerogatives by curbing
enforcement of such legislation.
Most federalism scholars pay too little attention to the important
role that enforcement priorities could play in protecting states' rights.2 7
From a legal realist perspective, enforcement clearly matters-it argua-
bly "controls the effective meaning of the law."28 In the extreme, an utter
lack of enforcement of a law is tantamount to repeal of that law. Notably,
24. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 1462 (discussing polling data).
25. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
26. For the view that the Constitution requires judicial review of Congress's lawmaking
powers, see, for example, Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and Stale Autonomy: Fed-
eralism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988) ("If the Constitution forbids federal
interference with state autonomy, then the courts cannot abandon their duty to enforce that limit
simply because the political process appears to provide a tolerable substitute for judicial review.");
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo , The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1466-68 (2001); William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1732 (1985).
27. For some noteworthy exceptions, see, for example, Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 893, 899 (2000) ("Overlooked in much of the debate about federalization is the central role that
prosecutors play in the federalization of crime-and the important role they can play in controlling
federalization."); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and En-
forcement Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 757, 759 (1999) (suggesting that "the nature and extent"
of Congress's delegation of lawmaking authority to federal prosecutors "cannot be assessed simply
by reference to the specificity of substantive lawmaking (or the lack thereof)", but must also consid-
er Congress's "interactions with, and manipulation of, the federal enforcement bureaucracy"); see
also Sam Kamin, Medical Mariuana in Colorado and the Future of Mariuana Regulation in the
United States, 43 McGEORGE L. REV. 147, 167 (2012) (examining Colorado's medical marijuana
industry and concluding that "the disconnect between the law as written and the conduct on the
ground may simply have gotten too great to be tenable going forward").
28. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 700
(2011).
[Vol. 89:41002
MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND FEDERALISM
of the 3,000 or so federal criminal laws now on the books,2 9 many appear
to be rarely (if ever) enforced.30
Enforcement of any law requires the ongoing appropriation of fiscal
and political capital, both of which are in short supply. The federal gov-
ernment employs about 100,000 law enforcement agents. That's a very
large number, but it's still only enough to investigate, prosecute, and
punish a tiny fraction of all criminal violations of federal law. And in-
creasing the federal government's capacity to enforce all of its criminal
laws vigorously would necessarily require raising taxes, a prospect that is
generally disfavored (to put it mildly) by most voters.
Hence, every year, federal lawmakers must decide how to allocate
this relatively fixed and finite level of resources across an expansive and
growing set of enforcement priorities. 32 Not surprisingly, the squeaky
wheel gets the grease in this process. The crisis that sparked federal leg-
islation in some past year commonly fades away and is eclipsed by a new
crisis that demands a portion of the enforcement pie. This means that law
enforcement priorities may shift over time, even though the content of
the law remains largely fixed. The appropriations process gives oppo-
nents of federal legislation the opportunity to scuttle it-de facto, if not
de jure-on an almost annual basis. The old laws stay on the books (re-
moving them is too difficult) but they can fade away, just like the crises
that inspired them.
A similar process is played out in the Executive Branch. Congress
budgets enforcement expenditures into categories," but sometimes
29. This figure is, at best, an estimate of the total number of federal crimes. See Mila Sohoni,
The Idea of "Too Much Law", 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1603-06 (noting that it is impossible to
tabulate precisely the number of federal crimes on the books).
30. Cf id. at 1606-07 ("Federal criminal law enforcement accounts for only about 6 percent
of the country's total felony prosecutions each year. A blinkered focus on metrics of numerosity
obscures these substantive details, which have obvious relevance to the question whether the quan-
tum of federal criminal law has exceeded the optimal level.").
It is revealing that more than two-thirds of all federal criminal prosecutions in 2011 involved just
three broad crime categories: drugs (31%), immigration (28%), and fraud (13%). THOMAS F.
HOGAN, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 17-19 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness20ll.pdf. For more detailed data on the
number of federal prosecutions by crime, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
31. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
(last updated Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmn?ty-tp&tid=74 (reporting 105,000 feder-
al agents whose primary function is the "prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the
apprehension of alleged offenders").
32. To be sure, Congress cannot necessarily control the level of enforcement resources dedi-
cated to particular crimes-e.g., marijuana distribution, health care fraud, etc. See Richman, supra
note 27, at 798. However, Congress can (and does) achieve a less precise level of control over en-
forcement by assigning responsibility for particular crime types (e.g., drug offenses) to particular
agencies (e.g., the DEA) and then controlling the funding of such agencies. See id. at 796-799.
33. For a breakdown of the Department of Justice's fiscal year 2012 budget, see
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 BUDGET & PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (2012),
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agents have broad discretion in spending the funds they've been allocat-
ed. If they disagree with legislation or simply don't consider it a high
priority, these agents can effectively scuttle it by refusing to enforce it-
openly or sub silentio.34
I do not suggest that under-enforced laws are entirely irrelevant. In-
deed, even un-enforced laws could have some impact on individual be-
havior, if people feel pressured to obey them due to moral obligations or
social norms.3 ' But the states' regulatory choices seem more likely to
matter when the federal government doesn't enforce its own.
Now, consider how the political forces just discussed have helped to
constrain enforcement of the federal ban on medical marijuana, thereby
preserving state prerogatives at least to some extent. The federal ban
hasn't quashed the medical marijuana movement-far from it. Sixteen
states have legalized medical marijuana as a matter of state law, notwith-
standing the federal ban.36 Six of those states have done so after Gonza-
les v. Raich put to rest any serious doubts about Congress's authority to
proscribe marijuana. 37 Marijuana use is rampant: "More than 14.4 million
people regularly use marijuana in the United States. . . ."3 This includes
more than-and perhaps many more than-400,000 medical marijuana
39 40users in just sixteen states. Oregon alone has 57,000 registered users.
Marijuana dispensaries have proliferated in some medical marijuana
states. Before a local ordinance limited their number, as many as 1,000
dispensaries may have been operating in Los Angeles County alone.41
Ten dispensaries will soon open in the District of Columbia, Congress's
own backyard.4 2 Unlike most illicit drug dealers, these dispensaries are
operating in plain sight-in other words, they're not hiding from the fed-
eral government. The Discovery Channel even hosts a documentary se-
ries, Weed Wars, showcasing people who are unabashed about flouting
the ban. And while the federal Executive continues to squeeze medical
marijuana distributors, some of its actions suggest the federal ban is now
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012summary/pdf/fyl 2-bud-summary-request-performance.pdf#bud-
sum.
34. For a discussion of how federal prosecutors prioritize their limited enforcement resources,
see generally Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221 (2003).
35. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY LAW (1990).
36. See MARUUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 1.
37. Id.
38. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1464 (emphasis added) (citing SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, fig. 2.1, available
at http:// www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k7NSDUH/2k7results.cfm#Ch2).
39. Id. (estimating number of medical marijuana users in thirteen states as of 2009).
40. OR. HEALTH AUTH., OREGON MEDICAL MARUUANA PROGRAM STATISTICS,
http://public.health.oregon.gov/diseasesconditions/chronicdisease/medicalmarijuanaprogram/pages/d
ata.aspx (reporting enrollment statistics for state medical marijuana registry).
41. See Parloff, supra note 5.
42. Tim Craig, D.C. Council Approves Limits on Medical Mariuana Growth, WASH. POST
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-council-approves-limits-on-
medical-marijuana-growth/2012/01/17/gIQAxLNa6P story.htmi.
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"more of what you'd call a 'guideline' than an actual rule." 4 3 In Colora-
do, for example, the United States Attorney recently issued letters to
twenty-three marijuana dispensaries, threatening them with civil and
criminal penalties, that is, unless they moved (all of the dispensaries in
question were located near schools). In other words, one United States
Attorney is now asking individuals who are openly flouting federal law
not to stop doing so altogether, but to do so more discretely.4
Why has the federal ban been so ineffectual at stopping the medical
marijuana movement? In large part, it is because political realities se-
verely curtail enforcement of it. To enforce a federal ban on medical
marijuana effectively would entail monumental financial and political
costs. It would take a massive commitment of new law enforcement re-
sources to hire more agents, pursue more arrests, launch more prosecu-
tions, and build more prisons just to dent the medical marijuana drug
trade. The federal government already spends approximately $2.4 billion
per year to combat marijuana.45 Just imagine how much more it would
take to seriously curtail this ubiquitous drug. All of this would require
comparable increases in federal taxation-and Congress is reluctant to
raise taxes, probably even to curb drugs.
But raising taxes to fund a troop surge in the war against medical
marijuana would be especially unpopular. Medical marijuana now has a
great deal of public support, apparently even among those who don't use
it. As mentioned earlier, over 70% of the population supports legalization
of the drug for medical purposes. 46 It stands to reason that most politi-
cians who oppose medical marijuana will incur some political costs in so
doing.
In the midst of this enforcement gap, states have been able to pursue
modest medical marijuana reforms. People are willing to participate in
state medical marijuana programs because the perceived benefits can be
quite high and because the legal consequences under federal law are-at
least on average-far from dire. States have been able to further weaken
the deterrent influence of the federal ban. For one thing, "[b]y legalizing
medical use of marijuana . . . state laws may have softened public atti-
tudes towards it. The use of marijuana may seem more efficacious and
less dangerous or wicked because it is permitted by state law."4 7 In addi-
tion, "people may feel relieved of the [moral] obligation to obey the fed-
43. To paraphrase Captain Barbossa in PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: CURSE OF THE BLACK
PEARL (Disney 2003).
44. John Ingold, All Targeted Colorado Mariyuana Dispensaries Near Schools Shut Down,
Feds Say, DENBER POST (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana/ci_20064569.
45. JEFFREY A. MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION 9-10
(2005), available at http://www.cannabis-commerce.com/library/MironReport 2005.pdf; see also
Robert A. Mikos, State Taration of Marituana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 223, 230-31 (discussing expenditures on marijuana prohibition).
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1472.
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eral ban because state law permits marijuana use," 48 especially "when
they deem the state-and not Congress-as having the 'legitimate right
to dictate their behavior' regarding marijuana use."4 9 Finally, the "pas-
sage of . .. state [medical marijuana] laws, many by wide margins, sig-
nals that society is more likely to support than to censure medical use of
marijuana," thereby removing the threat of social sanctions.o In short, by
passing their own laws approving of marijuana, "[s]tates have succeeded
at removing-or at least diminishing-the biggest obstacles curbing
medical use of marijuana: state legal sanctions and the personal, moral,
and social disapproval that may once have inhibited use of the drug."'
Importantly, the Supreme Court helps to ensure that these forces
continue to constrain Congress. In particular, Congress can't sidestep the
resource constraints and political gauntlet outlined above by comman-
deering the states' own lawmaking and law enforcement resources.52
This is a crucial constraint on Congress, because the states have substan-
tial law enforcement capacity-for example, they now handle 99% of all
marijuana cases.53 Congress can't duck the need to raise taxes-or the
potential wrath that would be caused by an even more aggressive cam-
paign against medical marijuana-by ordering state legislatures or state
executives to help quash the drug. The anti-commandeering rule enables
states to passively resist federal authority. The only thing the states may
not do is actively facilitate violations of the federal ban-e.g., by grow-
ing the drug themselves or helping others to do so.5 4
III. ARE CONSTRANTS ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
NECESSARILY A GOOD THING?
Are these constraints on federal law enforcement a desirable sup-
plement-or perhaps, even an alternative-to the other safeguards of
federalism? In this part, I offer some very tentative thoughts concerning
these questions.
First, it is important to note that resource constraints won't always
prevent enforcement of over-reaching federal legislation. Marijuana is, in
some respects, an unusually tough test for the federal government. The
federal ban on the drug is tough to enforce in large part because the drug
is so popular and so easy to grow. But other congressional prohibitions
are comparatively easy to enforce. This is true, for example, when the
48. Id. at 1474.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1478.
51. Id. at 1479; see also Robert A. Mikos, Compliance in Federal Systems (2012) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting empirical evidence that conflict between
state and federal laws erodes compliance with restrictive regulations).
52. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
53. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 1443 n.90.
54. See id. at 1445-50, for a detailed explanation of the extent to which the anti-
commandeering rule limits Congress's power to preempt state medical marijuana laws.
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proscribed behavior is relatively uncommon. The federal Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act, for example, proscribes one abortion procedure that is
relatively uncommon (the procedure was performed in about 4,000 cases
per year, prior to the ban) and one that can be performed by only a very
small cadre of specially-trained physicians." Not surprisingly, it would
seem that few people are willing to flout that ban (at least openly), even
though thirty-two states apparently permit the procedure outright (pursu-
ant to state law), and all of the rest permit the procedure in at least some
cases (e.g., to protect the mental health of a pregnant woman) when fed-
eral law does not.5 6
Even when the behavior Congress targets is more commonplace, as
with marijuana use, Congress can sometimes fill enforcement gaps by
empowering private citizens to help enforce its laws. Federal employ-
ment discrimination laws provide a prime example. Congress has em-
powered the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
enforce such laws, but the agency faces a daunting task: in 2011, for ex-
ample, nearly 100,000 individuals brought employment discrimination
claims to the agency's attention.57 The agency, with a total staff of 2,470
and a budget of $367 million, cannot fully investigate and prosecute eve-
ry such claim.58 Indeed, it typically files a rather paltry number of suits
against employers-only 300 in FY 2011.' However, the EEOC's litiga-
tion statistics clearly under-state the impact of federal employment law,
at least in part because federal law creates a private right of action
against employers who discriminate. In other words, aggrieved employ-
ees can bring suit directly against their employers (though sometimes,
only after they have filed a charge with the EEOC), "thereby lessening
the need for [the EEOC] to enforce the law."6 0
Second, even when the federal government cannot enforce its laws
vigorously, it can still limit the states' regulatory options in important
ways. The CSA, for example, makes it difficult for the states to monitor
and control their medical marijuana exemptions. Among other things, it
55. The prohibition is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). For a discussion of the frequency of
the procedure, see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134-35 (2007).
56. For a survey of state laws governing partial birth abortion, see Bans on "Partial-Birth"
Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Dec. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibBPBA.pdf.
57. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY1997
THROUGH FY 2011, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.
58. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC BUDGET AND STAFFING
HISTORY 1980 TO PRESENT, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/budgetandstaffing.cfn.
59. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2011, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm.
60. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1468 n.169. The number of suits brought by the EEOC (300 in
2011) compromises only a small fraction of the total number of employment and labor law suits filed
in federal court (roughly 37,000 in 2002). See Ann C. Hodges, Medication and the Transformation
of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 365, 369 n.27 (2004) (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl C-2 (2002)).
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prevents the states from directly cultivating and distributing marijuana,61
an approach that would undoubtedly enhance their ability to prevent di-
version of the drug into the black market and to protect patient health.
(Indeed, many states assumed ownership of all liquor stores following
the repeal of Prohibition, in order to better control the consumption of
alcohol.62) And some states have been reluctant to scrutinize individuals'
eligibility to use marijuana under state law, out of fear that any infor-
mation they gather about patients could be seized and exploited by feder-
al law enforcement agents.
Third, the constraints on the federal government's law enforcement
power may not protect individual rights adequately, even when they do
protect states' rights. With respect to medical marijuana, most people
flouting the federal ban will never be caught or punished. That is why I
have argued that "the states, and not the federal government, . . . have
emerged the victors" in the battle over medical marijuana. 4 But some
individuals have been and will continue to be prosecuted under the fed-
eral ban. To the extent the federal ban represents a usurpation of state
power, these prosecutions will seem unjust in our constitutional system.
And even if they are infrequent, the prosecutions may seem all the more
arbitrary and unjust due to their infrequency.65 We're much more com-
fortable in a world where troubling federal laws can't be enforced, but
only the lawmaking safeguards or judicial safeguards could provide that
assurance.
Lastly, it is important to recognize the danger that embracing open
defiance of federal law could breed contempt for the rule of law itself.66
The mode of preserving state prerogatives discussed herein hinges on
private citizens being willing to defy federal law-the more the better.
Some may applaud citizens who openly flout the federal marijuana ban,
61. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1426 (arguing that state distribution and cultivation programs are
preempted by the CSA); see also Mikos, supra note 22, at 662-63 (discussing the ease with which
preemption challenges could be raised in state courts).
62. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from
Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MILBANK Q. 461, 473-76 (1991) (suggesting that one of the
primary means of controlling alcohol once Prohibition was repealed was through state ownership of
retail distribution).
63. See Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government? 161 U.
PA. L. REv. 103 (2012).
64. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1425.
65. Cf Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 948 (2005)
(decrying disproportionate sanctions that arise as a result of federal case selection). There is another
reason not everyone will enjoy the benefits of the enforcement safeguards. Namely, some people
may feel a moral obligation to obey federal law, even if they know they will never be caught and
punished for so doing. These people will only enjoy the benefits of state law if the federal law is
repealed or invalidated by a court decision.
66. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854,
1866 (2005). This is a danger, of course, that the Supreme Court itself has arguably invited, by
refusing to impose a duty of fidelity upon the states. For an insightful discussion of competing views
of responsibility to the central authority in federal systems, see generally Daniel Halberstam, Of
Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality ofFederal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731 (2004).
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perhaps even hoping their actions will encourage others to do the same.
But what happens if such actions also encourage defiance of other feder-
al laws, such as federal school desegregation orders?
In spite of these concerns, the constraints on federal law enforce-
ment power generate some important benefits for our federal system that
should not be overlooked. In the gaps created by the under-enforcement
of federal law, states have been able to craft new policies that better re-
flect local preferences regarding the medical use of marijuana. In sixteen
different laboratories (far more, if local variations are included), policy-
makers are demonstrating the wisdom-or folly-of alternative ap-
proaches to medicine and drug abuse. The satisfaction derived and les-
sons learned from these experiments would never have emerged but for
the federal government's inability to vigorously enforce its own zero-
tolerance solution.
In the view of those who deem that federal policy oppressive, the
states are also serving as a valuable check against federal tyranny. To be
sure, they cannot shield their citizens from federal sanctions. But by giv-
ing medical marijuana use their blessing, the states might further erode
support for and the efficacy of federal law. In this way, the states might
serve as a modern instantiation of the Framers' vision of the states as
checks on federal tyranny.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conflict over medical marijuana policy holds some important
insights for the study of federalism more generally. Among other things,
the conflict exposes the shortcomings of assessing the federal govern-
ment's power vis-i-vis the states based on the mere existence of a federal
law governing some (ostensibly) state domain. The law as written clearly
matters, but how the law is enforced is perhaps a more accurate yardstick
of federal power.
The federal government passed a stringent ban on marijuana more
than four decades ago. Today, however, the federal government lacks the
fiscal and political capital needed to enforce that ban aggressively and to
quash the burgeoning medical marijuana movement. For example, the
number of prosecutions now being brought under the CSA pales in com-
parison to the number of violations now occurring. In the gap between
the federal ban as written and the federal ban as enforced, a growing
number of states have begun to experiment with more tolerant approach-
es to marijuana policy. As long as the political process continues to un-
derfund enforcement of the federal ban, it will provide some protection
for state power.
2012] 1009

